JOINT TRANSFORMATION AND THE DECISION TO USE FORCE
The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.
-George W. Bush
A nation protects and furthers its national interests through the use of a strategy for developing, applying, and coordinating its instruments of national power -diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. 2 When an interest is threatened, a strategy is formulated.
At some point, this strategy could include the violent, kinetic, use of force -either in war or the commission of a warlike act. With respect to feasibility, if a nation with a relatively limited means of waging war decided on that course at all, it would likely occur at a much later point in the strategy than for a nation with a relatively strong means of waging war. However, the contrary does not necessarily hold true. A nation with the capability of quickly and completely annihilating its enemy may find this strategy to be the most cost effective and feasible, but be restrained from using it because it is not acceptable to its citizens. Determining when and how much force to apply is a complex decision.
The United States has not always envisioned having a strong military. The Continental Army was disbanded because the founders feared a standing army. Over time, military strength has waxed and waned according to the needs of the nation and its security strategy. Prior to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the National Security Strategy called for a "strong military" and a policy of deterrence. 3 Following the attacks, the National Security Strategy for 2002 used more forceful language in describing the military: "The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy-whether a state or non-state actorto impose its will on the United States, our allies, or our friends." 4 This document also announced a policy of preemption as a means of self defense. 5 This change was reflected in the National Military Strategy. Its goal is: "…Full Spectrum Dominance -the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations." 6 As the military transforms to fulfill its goal of Full Spectrum Dominance, it is expected to have greater speed, precision, lethality, endurance, and a reduction in collateral damage. 7 These are all characteristics that would conceivably make the use of force more acceptable to the public. Potentially a military campaign could produce fewer casualties and less destruction while still bringing about the defeat of the enemy. This paper seeks to determine if the decision point to use force is likely to shift to an earlier point in the grand strategy as a result of transformation. The first section provides an overview of joint transformation and gives an indication of the potential 2020 force. The second section pairs this force with four scenarios from the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project and analyses where the decision point to use force might be in a crisis as compared to a historical example. 8 The third section offers conclusions on the impact of transformation on the decision point to use force.
Joint Transformation
Transformation is not meant to imply a future end-state for the military. 9 It is a process of change that has been taking place throughout history as militaries evolve to take advantage of new technologies, organizational concepts, and resources. Transformation is more than adopting a new technology to replace an old one. For example trading in a typewriter for a computer provides little advantage if the operator persists in using it as if it were a typewriter.
Transformation takes place when innovation leads to the implementation of a new way of working that takes advantage of the computer's power.
Military transformation is necessary today to take advantage of the rapid changes taking place in information technology. In 1965, Gordon E. Moore observed that semiconductor complexity was advancing rapidly -to the point that it was doubling approximately every two years. His discovery has since been named Moore's Law. This law holds that "The power of information technology will double every 18-months, for as far as the eye can see." 10 The power of information technology effects not only the transmission of information, but the gathering and processing functions as well. It enables machines to take over processes that would otherwise require human thought. Because of the rapid pace of the change, the gap between those who are able to apply the technology and those who can not is growing much wider than it has for previous mechanically based technology changes.
As Clausewitz notes, "War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty." 11 One significant element of this fog is uncertainty of the disposition of friendly forces. This knowledge is dependent on the network that connects the various formations of warfighters, their support systems, and the national command authority. Over time, communications technology progressed from visual and audio means (flags, drums, horns, couriers) to wire-line systems to radios. These improvements to the network often resulted in changes to doctrine and strategy that involved greater dispersion of forces and greater complexity of operations. The net level of uncertainty remained relatively constant at the decision maker's maximum level of tolerance.
The rapid progress of information technology is changing this balance. The capacity of the network has grown robust and reliable enough to accommodate greater dispersion and complexity while still maintaining and improving the friendly force picture. Each improvement in the friendly force picture reduces fog and enables better decisions.
A second element of fog is uncertainty of the disposition of enemy forces. Information technology enables ever increasing Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
capability. While the resolution of the enemy picture will not be as good as the friendly force picture and will vary depending on the nature of the enemy (conventional, irregular, terrorist, etc.) and terrain (open, urban, jungle, etc.), it should still continue to improve.
The networking of people, platforms, weapons, sensors, and decision aids, will result in a shared battle space awareness that greatly reduces uncertainty. Information superiority will lead to decision superiority. The network-centric force enables tactical formations to be selfsynchronizing. Speed, precision, lethality, and endurance are increased. The ability to mass the effects of joint forces will be enabled without having to mass forces. Collateral damage will be reduced.
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A RAND study evaluated network-centric operations applied to air-to-air combat. The performance of F-15s networked with the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System was compared to the performance of F-15s with only voice communications. Over 12,000 sorties were flown in both day and night conditions. The kill ratio was improved by two and a half times for the networked aircraft. Increased situational awareness provided more time for decision making and enabled self-synchronization. to Cuba, the Soviet Union had never deployed missiles off its own soil. Although the defense build up on Cuba was well known, it was not clear if it would include nuclear arms. The Soviets stated both publicly and privately that only defensive weapons were being shipped -no nuclear warheads would be deployed. When the assembly of Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba was discovered, President Kennedy could not comprehend why the Soviets had taken this action. 16 As the crisis unfolded both sides had difficulty determining their adversary's intent and how far In the midst of the crisis an early warning radar site inadvertently ran a test simulation of a nuclear attack. Concurrently, a second radar site that had just been brought online to provide redundant coverage detected a satellite. From NORAD's perspective, it looked like Cuba had launched a missile toward Florida. There would be no time to respond prior to the missile's impact. 19 Operator error increased the fog of uncertainty. As technology advances, the potential for errors intentionally or unintentionally induced by the system's operators will still remain. The decision maker will have high resolution data that will appear to be trustworthy and
accurate, yet could be completely false. These trends include areas such as: demographics, economics, energy, religion, technology, government, and foreign relations. The most significant trend is globalization and the effects of economic interdependence that it creates. The second most significant trend is the rise of radical Islam. The interaction of trends forms the basis for scenario development. In the first scenario, globalization dominates, but the dynamics are altered by a growing power shift to China and India. In the second scenario, the United States dominates the globalization trend.
In the third scenario, a growing transnational radical Islamic movement establishes a new Caliphate. In the fourth scenario, radical Islamic terrorism creates a pervasive climate of insecurity. 20 In the following paragraphs, I have overlaid a Full Spectrum Dominant military force on each of the scenarios and used the strategy formulation model to estimate the likelihood of using military force to resolve a national security threat.
Some essential factors do not lend themselves well to forecasting. In the absence of a forecast, I have assumed that the United States' National Security Strategy remains constant. A second critical factor is the individual decision maker -the President. There are a variety of theories explaining the dynamics of presidential decision making. 21 Likewise, the individual psychology and character of the president results in a unique approach to decisions. 22 Rather than try to second-guess the President, I have used my own judgment to maintain consistency. The scenario presents a number of potential national security issues for the United States.
Oil supply would undoubtedly be a concern, but I think whatever form of government takes root in the Middle East, it will still be inclined to export oil to raise capital. A fear of the unknown outcome of a changing geopolitical landscape could bring Eisenhower's Domino Theory back into vogue with the Caliphate replacing communism as the antagonist. Intervening militarily to support a friendly, but failing, government could be difficult to sustain in the long run and could
propagate Islamic radicalism in a way that would further destabilize other countries in the region. Pakistan however, as a nuclear power, could not be ignored. Even today, the Congressional Research Service notes that "Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and fissile material may be vulnerable to seizure in the event of a coup by dissident military officers or the seizure of power by radical Islamists with sympathy for terrorist groups." 33 What strategy might there be for securing Pakistan's nuclear weapons? Initially there could be economic support to help sustain the friendly regime. But if the regime appeared close to being overthrown and refused to relinquish its nuclear weapons to another state for safe keeping, the United States would have to decide if and when to forcibly try to secure them.
Pakistan's weapons are likely stored in component form -the nuclear device separate from the delivery means. 34 This would make it easier to transport and hide the nuclear component. Its weapons are also likely stored in locations hardened to protect them from a nuclear attack. 35 Intelligence for combating WMD is currently limited. 36 Even with future ISR systems, it is likely to be difficult to identify and track the movement of nuclear materials within Pakistan or across its borders.
The leaders of a military coup or radical Islamic movement could maintain the same level of security over nuclear weapons as the old regime but there would be no way of knowing for certain in advance. In the turmoil of a regime change, it would be easier to loose accountability of nuclear materials than when a regime is in steady state. A preemptive strike to seize nuclear weapons and destroy nuclear weapons production capability prior to the government's loss of control would be both risky and unprecedented. There would be no way of knowing with certainty that the government was indeed on the brink of being overthrown. An attack would weaken an already unstable government and could lead to a more rapid government transition or to an ungoverned state. Although a future force would have a higher probability of success than the current force, there would be no guarantee that all nuclear material would be recovered. India's and China's response could be unpredictable as well. In the end, I do not think having the capabilities of a future force would change the decision point to use force. The fog of not knowing the minds of the friends and adversaries involved would prevail. The decision point would be based on trying to determine the greater risk: failing to seize one or more nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike or failing to seize one or more during or following a regime change. The decision maker would have to look beyond the military piece and assess the overall political impacts.
Pervasive Insecurity Scenario
The fourth scenario is one of pervasive insecurity. The underlying causes of terrorism have not been resolved and its use continues to grow. The growth of terrorism results in greater security measures that inhibit the globalization process and result in an economic downturn.
The weakened economy increases poverty and destabilizes already weak states.
Disenfranchised youth are more easily recruited by radical Islamic organizations. Criminal organizations can more easily operate in the weak states resulting in increased arms and WMD trafficking. Terrorists do not necessarily need arms and WMD -they can use cyber-terrorism to attack utility systems, financial systems, communications systems, and any of the other networked systems on which we have grown dependent. A vicious cycle has developed where increasing security measures taken to counter terrorism result in the growth of terrorism.
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The decision to use military force in this scenario would be complex. There would undoubtedly be great domestic pressure to find a solution. On one hand there would be demands for greater security, while on the other there would be opposition to the increased government electronic monitoring of the citizenry and visitors necessary for detecting terrorists.
Business interests would oppose the cost increases associated with restricting the international flow of goods and services. A downturn in the economy resulting from a change in world trade would add more pressure. There would probably be competing proposals for courses of action each with its own political constituency.
Formulating a strategy involving military force would first need to identify an appropriate target. By 2020, terrorist organizations are likely to be decentralized, independent of state sponsorship, and internet based. 38 At least two courses of action would be available for using military force. First, there could be retaliatory strikes on terrorist leaders or facilities. Second, actions could be taken against a failed state or a state that tolerates terrorist activities. President Clinton's strategy in August of 1998 exemplifies the first course of action. In response to the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, he directed military strikes on six terrorist-related training facilities in Afghanistan and a chemical weapons production site in Sudan. These facilities were linked to Osama bin Laden who was linked to the bombings. 39 Domestically there was strong bipartisan congressional support for this action. 40 Additionally polls indicated that 66 percent of the American public supported the attack. 41 Internationally, support for the attacks was mixed. Traditional United States allies were supportive while Russia and Muslim countries were opposed. 42 The difficulty with this course of action is revealed in the cost benefit analysis. The necessary ISR, targeting, and force projection required to destroy terrorist training camps is well within the means of the military. While destruction of facilities may satisfy the desire for retaliation, it does not necessarily achieve any long term benefits. In the above example, 47-percent of the American public believed the attacks were likely to increase the risk of terrorist actions against Americans. 43 This finding would reinforce the cycle of fear envisioned in the future scenario. It is indeterminable if the attacks prevented or delayed a future terrorist attack -but it is clear that terrorist attacks have continued with greater severity.
Training camps have minimal infrastructure and are easily replaced. The Muslim opposition to the strikes likely encouraged more terrorist recruits. Positively identifying a WMD production site and convincing the public with unclassified data is much more difficult than identifying a training camp. The site that President Clinton referred to as a chemical weapons production facility was the El Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Company plant in Khartoum, Sudan. A soil
sample from near the plant tested positive for a chemical that can be converted into VX nerve gas. From the perspective of the Sudanese, the League of Arab States, and other Muslim countries, the plant was only producing animal-deworming fluid. 44 The assets of the plant's owner were frozen, but were later released because the United States government did not want to reveal supporting intelligence data in court. 45 Over a year after the destruction of the plant, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence still had concerns about the evidence used to justify the attack. 46 It can not be proven to the public whether or not the plant produced nerve agent -but the attack clearly damaged American credibility in the region and generated antiAmerican sentiment.
For this course of action, I conclude that the decision to use military force in the future will be no more likely than it is today. Today's weapon systems can already precisely target terrorist facilities with minimal risk of collateral damage. Technology will not remove the potential for innocent civilians straying into the impact area. Tomorrow's ISR platforms are likely to provide greater certainty of a facility being terrorist related, but the data will still be too classified to present to the public. The terrorist's ability to exploit the destruction for their propaganda campaign will further the cycle of violence. Therefore the decision process to use force in this case is unlikely to be effected by having a Full Spectrum Dominance military. In the future scenario, the decision to undertake a regime change, instead of a retaliatory strike or other action, would depend on considerations of how to achieve Liddell Hart's "better peace." 48 A network-centric military might secure a rapid military defeat, but there would still need to be an ability to establish a new government capable of maintaining sovereignty over the state. In this respect, the unresolved conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq could counter balance decision makers' enthusiasm for the rapid employment of a transformed force.
Conclusion
Joint transformation will achieve a network-centric force that will have the information superiority necessary to achieve decision superiority over an enemy force. Speed, precision, lethality, and a reduction in collateral damage will result. In order to determine if this transformation would result in an earlier decision point to use force, four future scenarios where analyzed.
In the China and U.S. dominance scenarios, the network-centric force was matched against China's future force in a Taiwan Straits conflict. Analysis determined that in a conventional conflict, the decision point to use force would depend on China initiating an attack.
The decision for preemptive use of force to counter WMD would be based on an assessment of China's intent, not friendly force capabilities.
The Caliphate scenario considered an unstable Pakistan where continuity of the current friendly regime is uncertain. It could be on the verge of overthrow by either radical Islamists or a military coup. Security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons would be at risk. Analysis determined that the decision to use force would be based on the probability of the loss of control of nuclear materials -again a separate issue from the capabilities of the joint transformed force.
The insecurity scenario assessed when military force might be used to counter terrorism in a world of pervasive insecurity. In the case of a retaliatory strike or a forcible regime change the decision point to use force would be based on an assessment of the potential consequences to determine if stability would be increased in the long term. Superior capability might make commitment of the military theoretically easier, but the realities of the domestic and international political situation would probably far outweigh such considerations.
Overall, it is apparent that although the conduct of war will change as a result of transformation, the decision to wage war will not be significantly affected. At the grand strategy level in the United States, considerations of how to achieve enduring security within acceptable political and ethical constraints will prevail over the expedient use of military power.
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